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Abstract 
Many organizations today are seeking to improve security by implementing multi-factor authentication, 
i.e. authentication requiring more than one independent mechanism to prove one’s identity. One-time 
passwords in the form of hardware tokens in combination with conventional passwords have emerged 
as the predominant means in high security environments to satisfy the independent identification 
criteria for strong authentication. However, current popular public one-time passwords solutions such 
as HOTP, mOTP, TOTP, and S/Key depend on the computational complexity of breaking encryption or 
hash functions for security. This thesis will present an efficient and information-theoretically secure one-
time password system called Shamir-OTP that is based upon secret sharing techniques. 
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Introduction 
This thesis’s goal is to introduce a one-time password system that has been derived from techniques 
initially developed to implement secret sharing. The advantages and disadvantages of such a system will 
be described and compared to other current password systems. An appendix is included that describes 
multiple implementations and how to use them. 
Background 
Before being presented, a background of prerequisite topics will be given independently and then 
combined into a functional password system. 
One Time Passwords 
One-time passwords are passwords that are only valid for a single or small number of transactions. This 
contrasts with conventional passwords which are valid for many transactions as users are reluctant to 
voluntarily change passwords frequently. Since OTPs are only valid for a limited number of uses, an 
attacker has a smaller window of time to gain access to resources guarded by such a password because 
any previously stolen passwords will likely have become invalid. As with traditional passwords, one-time 
passwords are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks [1]. By observing the OTP before it is successfully 
received by the authenticator, an attacker has a valid password. Because of this undesirable property, 
both OTPs and conventional passwords must travel securely. 
Typically, the one-time password is generated by a hardware device that the person desiring to be 
authenticated carries to promote use across many physically distant domains. The hardware implements 
an algorithm that generates passwords in a specific manner that the authenticator knows. The hardware 
device will often display the password on a small screen for a user to type into the authenticator.  
In this hardware based approach, if the hardware or computer that generates the passwords were 
stolen, the thief would be able to authenticate himself just by reading the numbers on the display. 
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Because of this reason, one-time passwords are often one part of a multi-factor authentication (MFA) 
system where two or more independent factors of authentication are used to identify a user. The three 
factors consistently considered possible for authentication are something the user knows, something 
the user has, and something the user is. Others methods such as someone you know have also been 
suggested [2]. The static password satisfies the something you know factor. Being able to enter a valid 
OTP implies that you have the password generator; the something you uniquely have factor is satisfied.  
Implementing this strategy alleviates the fear of a lost password generator falsely authenticating a 
malicious entity. 
With the increase in the popularity of mobile cellular phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs), 
there have been some attempts to use these devices as a physical OTP generating device. In this case, 
the phone or PDA will satisfy the something you uniquely have factor of authentication and the 
password it generates shows this. Initially, when these devices were limited in capabilities, the OTP 
would be sent to the device as a text-message that the user would then be able input into the system 
for authentication. Electronically authenticating for the bank JPMorgan Chase uses this approach along 
with a traditional password [3].  As more capable mobile operating systems and devices began to 
appear, most modern mobile phones and PDAs are able to generate the OTP themselves and can 
completely replace a dedicated hardware device or a text-messaging solution. Recently Google has been 
utilizing this approach to enable MFA for all accounts that opt-in [4]. 
Algorithms generating temporary passwords can be time-based or mathematical-based. Time-based 
algorithms generate passwords that are valid for a set period of time before automatically updated by 
the algorithm (often a hardware device). Technically, a one-time is a misnomer as a password can be 
used multiple times as long as it is within one time period. A hardware device of this type typically 
always displays a password, and the password is constantly changing. The length of time that an OTP is 
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valid is an important security parameter in these schemes because one password is valid until the time 
period expires and then updated. If a password is infrequently updated, an attacker has a longer 
window for exploitation. As the period length grows, the security of OTPs approaches that of 
conventional passwords. For example, an eavesdropper could capture the OTP that has just been 
generated as it travels across a network. Once captured, the attacker has the entire lifetime of the 
password for unauthorized access.  
One implementation difficulty of time-based passwords is that the clock of the password generator must 
be synchronized with the clock of the authenticator or else a user may be wrongfully denied 
authentication. Another concern when utilizing a time-based OTP is clock drift. Clock drift is the 
phenomena where different clocks do not run at the same speed and after some time, will not have the 
same time value at the same point in time, even if they did previously. Often, the way to reduce 
problems with clock drift is to have periodic clock resynchronization or have the authenticator accept a 
range of passwords, say two time periods, reducing the security of the system. SecurID is a proprietary 
commercial system by RSA Security that uses hardware devices to generate passwords that change 
every thirty or sixty seconds [5]. 
For a concrete example of one such time-based one-time password algorithm, the public algorithm 
Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) is described. 
Setup 
 Establish a shared secret integer   between the authenticator and the user 
 Agree upon a time step   and an initial time    
Authentication 
 The user calculates   ⌊
(                )
 
⌋  
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 The user sends the authenticator    (   ) where HOTP is a OTP generation algorithm based 
upon cryptographic hash functions described below 
The authenticator is able to verify that the password is valid as any password generated outside of the 
current time step since    will differ. Also, since the shared key is present, the authenticator can be sure 
the password was generated by someone in possession of the shared key [6]. 
Mathematical-based generate passwords that do not have values based on time; instead they are 
generated algorithmically each time a password is desired. The authenticator and client’s algorithms are 
in step with each other. In many cases, this involves a counter that is incremented each round. Every 
time a client is successfully authenticated, the authenticator will only accept the next OTP generated by 
the algorithm. Unlike time-based OTPs, mathematically-based OTPs are valid for only one use and are 
not vulnerable to the attack described above in which a password is used twice within one period. Also, 
clock synchronization and drift are not a concern. One area of concern is if a mathematical-based 
password is stolen, it can be valid indefinitely, as long as the real user does not attempt to authenticate, 
thus advancing the password the authenticator is expecting. 
Implementation issues for these algorithms include keeping the authenticator and client’s algorithms 
synchronized. For example, suppose a client’s hardware device presented a password and the user of 
this device is unable to correctly enter that number to the authenticator. If the user indicated to the 
hardware prematurely that the password was accepted, the user has no way of retrieving the old 
password that the authenticator is waiting for. To combat this, often implementations have the 
authenticator accept a window of passwords and adjust this window based on the last valid password 
entered. S/Key and hash-based OTP (HOTP) are two popular forms of mathematical-based password 
generators. 
 
 
5 
 
For a concrete example, S/Key, sometimes known as Lamport’s scheme, is a popular OTP solution 
developed to authenticate dumb terminals on Unix-like operating systems [7]. The password generation 
is based off a cryptographic hash function. 
Setup 
 Establish a secret key   
 Apply a cryptographic hash function ( ) to     times 
 Discard   
 The authenticator stores  ( ) while the clients stores  ( )         *        + 
Authentication 
 To be authenticated the     time,   the user provides    ( )         *       + 
 The authenticator computes (    ( )) and compares it the stored value on the server: 
      ( ) 
 If the result matches the stored value, discard the stored value and store    ( ) 
For simplicity, the output of the hash function can be mapped to simple English words to facilitate input 
into a terminal. This is an example of a solution that has a finite number of uses before re-initialization 
of the system must take place. Most implementations forbid this re-initialization from being done 
remotely. 
Other more modern schemes such as the HOTP do not have this re-initialization limitation.  HOTP is built 
upon hashed-based message authentication codes (HMAC) and often uses the Secure Hash Algorithm 
(SHA-1) for cryptographic hashing [8]. HOTP is published by the Initiative for Open Authentication 
(OATH). Conceptually, HOTP calculates the SHA-1 based HMAC keyed with a shared secret on a counter. 
The steps to compute a given password with HOTP are: 
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 Establish a shared secret   
 Initialize a counter   to zero 
 Define  as an HMAC calculated with SHA-1 
 Let          be a function that selects 4 bytes in a standard manner 
 A client wishing to be authenticated sends         ( (   ))             
 If the authenticator’s value matches the clients, then the client is authenticated 
 Both parties increment   
As in the case with S/Key, the result is often too large to be entered into a keypad or other device by a 
client. Instead of transforming the result into words as in S/Key, HOTP simply calculates the remainder 
when divided by the maximum value (                               ). Many other systems based 
upon this approach exist. One could swap out HMAC with the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm, 
the Advanced Encryption Algorithm (AES), or any other encryption mechanism. HOTP’s sister standard in 
OATH, Time-based One Time Password (TOTP), replaces the counter   with the current time, thus 
converting the mathematical-based HOTP into a time-based OTP. 
Secret Sharing 
Secret sharing is a mechanism that allows a secret to be divided into multiple shares, such that when a 
certain amount of these shares are combined, the secret can be obtained. For notation, a scheme that 
divides a secret   into   shares and requires   shares to reconstruct the secret is called a (   )-
threshold scheme. An attacker possessing     shares should have low probability of successfully 
reconstructing  , but anyone in possession of   shares should efficiently be able to construct   with 
probability 1 [9]. Simple secret sharing schemes can be divided into two phases, dealing of the secret 
and reconstruction of the secret. 
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Secret Sharing was described in 1979 independently by Shamir and Blakley and has since triggered 
numerous papers describing properties and uses of secret sharing schemes. The canonical use of secret 
sharing schemes is to distribute a long term key, such as a private key to a major bank, in a manner that 
prevents a single break-in from compromising the entire system. Recently this mechanism has been 
used to distribute the long term key signing key of the Domain Name System Security Extensions 
(DNSSEC) root zone with a (   )-threshold scheme [10]. In the event of the necessity to generate this 
key, 5 of these 7 individuals will have to meet at a base in the United States. 
For a concrete implementation of such schemes, this paper will discuss the version presented by Shamir. 
Shamir's original secret sharing scheme is the most popular scheme and is often used in most academic 
examples and papers on the subject. This scheme works by a dealer defining a polynomial of degree   
where the polynomial evaluated at 0 is the secret. The shares are the polynomial evaluated at other 
unique points.  
 Establish a shared secret   
 Define  ( )          
             
    where   is the threshold value 
 The set of shares is {(   ( ))      *     +} where   is the number of shares to be made 
To reconstruct the secret from only the shares, use the Lagrange polynomial to interpolate the 
polynomial from the given points. Once the polynomial has been reconstructed, the shared secret is the 
function evaluated again at 0. 
 Given a set   of shares of size  , define    to be the input to the constructed polynomial above 
and    to be the output of the constructed polynomial for share      
 Compute     ∑
   
      
      
    where   is the index of each share  
 Compute the secret by ∑      
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Shamir’s scheme is information-theoretic secure. By this, we formally mean that every possible secret is 
equally likely after having viewed up to      shares. This prevents an attacker from having a reduced 
amount of secrets to guess by observing some of the shares, but not   shares, that have been 
compromised. This will be shown later. 
Verifiable Secret Sharing 
In a conventional secret sharing scheme, a corrupt dealer can deal invalid shares to participants or 
malicious users may present an invalid share in an attempt to gain information about the secret. With 
these capabilities, a dealer can restrict which sets of shares that can actually reconstruct the correct 
secret. There are attacks where an attacker who was not dealt a share initially presents invalid shares to 
other participants to prevent them from being able to reconstruct the secret and simultaneously 
allowing the attacker to recreate the secret [11].  
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) solves these problems by guaranteeing that even if the dealer is malicious 
and delivers corrupt shares to some participants or some participants present an invalid share, there is a 
well-defined secret all participants will reconstruct. These schemes often provide a mechanism for 
detecting an invalid share with high probability. Thus, a dealer or malicious participant is unable to 
present an invalid share without being caught. This is usually accomplished by having the dealer commit 
to some information pertaining to the secret and publically release it. Then any participant can verify the 
share they received independently by using the public information and the information that they 
received. Since the information is public, the participant can be assured that everyone is using the same 
information to verify their shares and was not dealt bad information. 
Paul Feldman proposed a popular VSS scheme based on homomorphic encryption [12]. The scheme is 
non-interactive, meaning bidirectional communication between the participant and the dealer of the 
shares is not required. The scheme is not information-theoretic secure as it leaks information about the 
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secret – a non-computationally bound adversary can learn the secret by observing information related 
to the VSS procedure. The scheme does have the property that an infinitely powerful dealer is unable to 
generate an incorrect share. 
A VSS scheme devised by Pedersen is considered the dual of Feldmen’s in the sense that it is in non-
interactive and information-theoretically secure [13]. However, in this scheme, if the dealer is not 
computationally bound, then he is capable of generating corrupt shares. Pedersen shows the 
impossibility of achieving a system which is simultaneously information-theoretic non-interactive and 
one in which a non-computationally bound dealer cannot cheat. This means that while maintaining non-
interactivity, a verifiable secret sharing scheme either allows non-computationally bounded attackers to 
learn information about the secret or allows non-computationally bounded dealers to cheat, but not 
both. 
Conceptually, Pedersen’s scheme will share a secret using Shamir's secret sharing scheme but also have 
the dealer commit to each share while each participant verifies these commitments. 
 Chose   and   large primes such that          
 Define    the unique subgroup of order  , and   a generator of    
o It can be tested if an element        by          
     
 The dealer  wishes to share an        
 Chose a          such that nobody knows     ( ) 
 Define  (   ) as         
 Chose a random        
   publishes a commitment to the secret          (   ) 
   constructs a second polynomial of degree    :  ( )      ∑ (      
 )       
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   broadcasts     (     ) for     *       +  and    are the coefficients of  ( ) used to 
distribute the secret 
   computes  ( ) for     *     +  
   sends participant    (    ( )) for     *     +  
 Each participant    verifies their share     ( ) for    *     + by  (    ( ))   ∏   
     
    
o For clarity:   
           
       (     )
        (     )
      (       ) 
 
    
 (       ) 
   
       
         
   
        
         
   
    ( )      ( )        
   ( ) 
The dealer commits to the secret with  (   ) and subsequently commits to the material that generated 
the share with  (     ). This information, along with other public information such the shares, reveals 
no information about the secret but allow participants to verify their share is a portion of the secret. 
Proactive Secret Sharing 
Generally, secret sharing schemes are designed to protect long term secrets, but if more than   shares 
were compromised over this long period of time, the secret is no longer safe. Thus there is a need to 
protect the shares over a long period of time. Proactive secret sharing (PSS) is a modification to the 
typical secret sharing scheme that allows shares to be updated periodically [14]. A PSS takes a set of 
shares and updates them such that attempting to reconstruct the secret with both non-updated and 
updated shares fails. PSSs allows up to     shares to be leaked within each period between updates. If 
an attacker gathers   or more shares from the same period, the secret is still compromised as in 
traditional secret sharing. Stated differently, more than     shares can be revealed as long as no more 
than     of those shares are from the same period  . This has the effect of reducing the lifetime of the 
secret to the length of the period chosen. This makes the length of the period an important security 
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parameter. As this length reaches infinity, the scheme becomes less effective, but as the period 
approaches 0, precious resources are spent constantly updating the shares. 
A PSS scheme presented by Herzberg et. al. uses a modified Shamir secret sharing scheme that requires 
all participants    for     *    + to update the shares every period. The scheme works with Shamir’s 
scheme presented above, but after each period is expired, an update process takes place. The update 
process involves each participant creating a random polynomial whose free coefficient is 0 (i.e  ( )  
 ). Each participant distributes this polynomial evaluated at certain values such that at the end, each 
share has been updated correctly by every participant’s function. The update process for a normal 
Shamir secret sharing scheme is: 
 Each participant    for     *    + generates a     degree polynomial   ( ) where 
  ( )      
    sends            ( ) securely 
    updates his share    by          ∑     
 
    
 Old shares and update information are deleted 
This scheme clearly shows that the original constructed polynomial  ( ) will be replaced with  ( )  
   ( )        ( ). Since zero was the free coefficient for the polynomials constructed by every 
participant, the new polynomial evaluated at 0 is still the original secret:  ( )   ( )     ( )     
   ( ). An attacker attempting to contribute one or more previously compromised shares that have 
since been updated will cause the entire reconstruction process to fail as a different polynomial will be 
reconstructed. 
This PSS is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack that could lead to a denial of service. An attacker 
could realize that an update process was initiated by listening for update material from any participant 
and replacing the update material with their own. This technique corrupts the share that is being 
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updated and prevents it from being able to participant successfully in future reconstructions of the 
secret. 
To corrupt the share, the attacker just needs to send update material that differs from the polynomial 
value that was intended for the victim. As the victim’s share replaces the previous version, the share is 
permanently corrupted. One or more attackers could repeat this kind attack to a total of       
participants. This would destroy the possibility of recreating the secret as there are not enough valid 
shares to meet the threshold value required.  
For demonstration purposes, if the attacker was a malicious participant, by constructing a 
polynomial  ( )      ( )   , the participant could destroy the secret and prevent successful 
reconstruction of the secret. An example of such a corruption is presented below. 
 Participant    is malicious 
    generates a     degree polynomial   ( ) where   ( )     
    sends            ( ) for   *     +     
If the malicious participant is successful in having any of the other participants accept the corrupted 
update material, the secret not be able to be successfully reconstructed if that participant participates. 
The attacker will have successfully launched a denial of service attack on the scheme without violating 
any security principles. 
In this scheme, there is no method to detect this attacker. VSS schemes such as the one presented 
above may be utilized to commit to update material. Participants would not reconstruct the secret when 
there is an invalid share present nor would they update their share if the update information was 
invalid. The prevention of this attack could also be facilitated by normal cryptographic utilities such as 
asymmetric encryption; however this is not information-theoretically secure. 
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Proposed OTP solution using Secret Sharing Techniques 
Using secret sharing, verifiable secret sharing, and proactive secret sharing, I will present a 
mathematical-based OTP solution that is information-theoretically secure. The solution requires three 
phases: dealing, reconstruction, and update. 
Motivation 
The idea of using a shared secret as a form of authentication is nothing new as many schemes use this 
already. For instance, static passwords rely on a shared secret between the authenticator and the user 
wishing to be authenticated. Using a portion of a shared secret could also be a method of 
authentication.  
The most important property that arises when using only the portion of a secret as an authentication 
mechanism is that the portion is information-theoretic secure. This means that the secret that has been 
split is not revealed when seeing only one portion as long as the threshold is greater than one. This is 
great for environments like the Internet that require information to be publically viewable to many 
users. For this property to be useful the secret must have some intrinsic value that the share does not or 
else an eavesdropper would be satisfied capturing the share. Also, since the secret is not available on 
any one computer, stealing the secret is more difficult. Once again, this is not important unless the 
secret has some value besides authentication, such as a Social Security Number. The property of 
information-theoretic secure shares was the driving motivation for investigating the use of secret 
sharing for authentication. 
Another property of using partial secrets as authentication is their distributed nature. For instance, a 
password could be broken up among many people and only when so many are together can 
authentication of a group be established. The often used example of launching a nuclear missile 
depending on multiple high ranking officials comes to mind.  
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Despite these obvious uses, there has not been any research into using secret shares strictly as an 
authentication mechanism nor a periodic/temporary authentication mechanism as is the case with one-
time passwords. If the share was just delivered to the authenticator as proof of identify, secret sharing 
authentication provides no additional protection to traditional passwords. However, used in an OTP 
system with changing shares, the properties listed above can be realized. Often time, the techniques 
used to construct this secret sharing based OTP come from research that had completely different 
visions in mind. For example, the papers that describe updating secrets in a proactive manner had in 
mind preventing long term shared secrets, such as private keys, from being compromised. In the case of 
an OTP system, updating shares is a great way to generate new passwords. Verifiable secret sharing was 
intended to prevent malicious dealers from preventing certain participants from being able to 
successfully reconstruct the secret but has in the case of a password system validating update material. 
Overview 
The user and an authenticator will agree on a shared secret, like a conventional password. This shared 
secret will then be split using a (   )-threshold scheme (2 shares requiring both shares to reconstruct 
the split secret). The user receives a share and the authenticator receives the other share. Under normal 
situations, this process can be happen via the distribution of a smart card or other physical contact. If an 
encrypted connection is utilized, the theoretical solution can be compromised unless an information-
theoretic secure encryption mechanism is used. Using the share as the password, the user presents this 
to the authenticator. The authenticator uses his share and the user’s share to reconstruct the secret and 
compare it to the stored secret. If the secret is successfully reconstructed, the user is successfully 
authenticated. After successful authentication, both parties use proactive secret sharing to update the 
shares and unlike traditional proactive schemes, the secret is updated as well. Both parties should 
invalidate the old shares and secret by securely deleting the material. 
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Detail 
Expanding on the overview above is a detailed description. The secret sharing techniques verifiable 
secret sharing and proactive secret sharing have been tailored to suit an OTP solution. The entire 
solution will be proven to be information-theoretic secure in later sections. The setup involves an OTP 
generator, which produces passwords, and authenticator, which verifies password, sharing and 
communicating information. 
Setup 
A password generator and authenticator need to setup a shared secret as per Shamir’s classic paper. 
Since most of the variables are updated during the update procedure, they will be designated with 
superscripts describing the interval in which they are valid. For example, the polynomial   ( ) is valid 
only for the first password (before the first password is used). 
 The generator and authenticator agree on two large primes   and   such that   divides     
o   will be used in the verification section later 
 The generator and authenticator agree on a field   of order   
 Agree on a shared secret      
 The authenticator constructs a polynomial with coefficients    ( )     
     
     where 
  
      
 The generator accepts the share   
      ( )      
     
     securely 
 The authenticator saves the share   
      ( )      
     
     securely 
Use 
The password for the generator to present to the user who is to enter it into the authenticator is the 
generator’s share. 
 The user enters   
  as her password where   represents the current interval 
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  The authenticator uses   
  and   
  to reconstruct the polynomial   ( )     
     
     via 
interpolation 
  The authenticator computes   ( )     
     and compares to the stored secret    
Update 
The update process changes the last used password into the next. The transformation uses proactive 
secret sharing to prevent information about the secret being leaked from previous passwords. 
  The generator picks     
  in   to construct   
 ( )          
    
 The authenticator picks     
  in   to construct   
 ( )          
    
 The generator computes     
     
 ( ) and     
     
 ( ) 
 The user enters     
  to the authenticator 
  The authenticator computes     
     
 ( ) and     
     
 ( ) 
 The authenticator presents     
  to the user to enter into the generator 
 The generator constructs the a share   
       
       
       
  
 The authenticator constructs a new share   
       
       
       
  
 Both parties update the secret           
 Both parties delete securely all invalid information 
Any future verification operates as described above. 
Verification 
Currently, an attacker is able to perform a denial of service attack by sending corrupted update material 
that destroys shares. This was described on the general description of proactive secret sharing. To 
prevent this, digital signatures may be used. By having the authenticator and generator sign their update 
material they can accept the update material with the confidence the signing algorithm provides. 
Similarly a keyed hash function keyed with the secret may also be used for authentication as non-
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repudiation is not needed. However, unless the mechanism is information theoretic secure, this would 
still present a vulnerability to an attacker with unlimited computational ability. By breaking the 
asymmetric cryptographic scheme or producing collisions in the hash function, an attacker could corrupt 
a participant of the OTP scheme’s generated OTP. To correct this denial-of-service vulnerability, 
verifiable secret sharing should be used.  
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is a technique that often uses bit-commitment schemes to ensure that 
shares in a secret sharing scheme are valid. Presented below is a modified version of the update scheme 
above that uses Pedersen's information-theoretic VSS scheme to commit to the update material. 
Conceptually, the generator commits to the update material using the secret. The authenticator is able 
to verify the update material because the authenticator is in possession of the secret. The same process 
works for the authenticator desiring to commit to the update information intended for the generator. 
The outline presented below is in the case of the generator creating information for the authenticator to 
verify its update material. The reverse situation will be outlined afterwards. 
 Define    as the unique cyclic subgroup of   
  order   where   was agreed upon during 
initialization. 
o It can be tested if an element   is contained in    by          
     
 Choose          such that nobody knows     ( ). Store these values at initialization time 
 The parameters     and    are parameters defining the system 
 The generator wishes to share     
    
 ( )          
        
 Define a function   as  (   )          
 The generator constructs a polynomial of degree 1:   
 ( )       
       
      for     
      
     
 The generator outputs a commitment to the secret         
   (       
 )  
 The generator outputs     
   (    
      
 ) 
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 The generator outputs   
 ( ) and     
  
 The authenticator verifies     
  is valid by checking whether  (    
    
 ( ))       
  (    
 )
 
 is 
true. 
o For clarity of the steps:     
  (    
 )
 
 (  
 
      
 
)   (           
 
)
 
 
  
               
      
       
 ( )     
 ( )   (    
    
 ( )) 
The same process outlined above when altered slightly can be used when the authenticator is 
generating material for the generator to verify. The authenticator would follow the steps, generating a 
random polynomial   
 ( ) and sharing     
   (       
 )     
   (    
      
 ),     
   and   
 ( ). The 
verification of this material by the generator would be accomplished by checking 
whether  (    
    
 ( ) )      
      
 . Note the differences that   
 ( ) is evaluated at 1 instead of 2 and 
that verification does not exponentiate     
 . Once the update material has been verified, then both 
parties can update their shares as shown above without worry of corruption. 
Worked Example 
A worked example is presented below for clarity. This example offers little security as the field chosen is 
small and brute forcing the current password is feasible. 
Setup 
 The generator and authenticator agree two large primes 23 and 11, note that 11 divides      
 The generator and authenticator agree on a field       
 Both agree on a shared secret          
 The authenticator constructs a polynomial   ( )        over     
 The generator accepts the share   
    ( )          (      ) securely 
 The authenticator saves the share   
    ( )          (      ) 
 Let     *                         +, the unique cyclic subgroup of     of order   
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 The authenticator and generator agree on     and      
Use 
The generator uses the share as the one-time password. 
 The generator presents    
    as the user’s password 
 The authenticator uses   
    and   
    to reconstruct the polynomial   ( )        via 
interpolation 
 The authenticator computes   ( )          (      ) and compares it to the secret 3 
Update with Verification 
 
 The generator picks     
    in   to construct    
 ( )        
 The generator computes     
    
 ( )    (      ) and     
    
 ( )    (      ) 
 The generator picks constructs a random polynomial   
 ( )        over     
 The authenticator picks     
    in   to construct    
 ( )        
 The authenticator computes     
    
 ( )    (      ) and     
    
 ( )    (      ) 
 The authenticator picks constructs a random polynomial   
 ( )         over     
 The generator outputs  
o     
    
 
      
 
           (      ) 
o     
       
 
      
 
          (      ) 
o     
    
o   
 ( )    (      ) 
 The authenticator outputs 
o     
    
 
      
 
           (      ) 
o     
       
 
      
 
           (      ) 
o     
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o   
 ( )    (      ) 
 To verify, the authenticator computes the following and compares the results for equality 
o  (   )           (      ) 
o     
  (    
 )
 
         (      ) 
 The authenticator computes the new share   
    
                    (      ) 
 To verify, the generator computes the following and compares the results for equality 
o  (   )            (      ) 
o     
      
          (      ) 
 The generator computes the new share   
    
                     (      ) 
 Both participants update their secret               (      ) 
 Both participants securely delete all invalid information 
 The updated shares construct the correct secret 9 as demonstrated by        
  (      ) 
This process has been visualized in Figure 1 for understanding purposes. Next time the user wants to be 
authenticated, the authenticator must check the newly updated secret instead of the original secret that 
they agreed upon at initialization and use the updated shares to reconstruct this newer secret. 
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Figure 1: The functions involved in the update procedure. Note values have not been modulated into     for visualization 
purposes. 
Security Analysis 
The security of the proposed OTP solution depend on the security of Shamir's secret sharing scheme, the 
security of proactive secret sharing, and the security of verifiable secret sharing (if it is used). Shamir's 
secret sharing scheme is proven information theoretic secure as any set of shares less than the 
threshold gives no information on the secret.  By adapting the proof for general purpose secret sharing 
to that of a scheme with a fixed number of shares (2) and a set threshold (2), showing the security 
properties of the OTP scheme follows easily. 
Proposed OTP Scheme Proof Outline 
To show the security of the one-time password scheme, we need to show that by seeing a password, the 
number of possible secrets ( ( )) used in generating that password is unchanged. We show this by 
establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the possible functions that could have generated 
the observed password and all secrets that were initially possible. Since the functions that could have 
generated the share we observed are related to all possible secrets in this correspondence, then any of 
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these functions with unique secrets  ( ) could have resulted in the generation of the observed 
password.  
Proposed OTP Scheme Proof 
Establish the one-time password scheme by sharing a secret   between a generator and an 
authenticator. Now suppose an eavesdropper observed the generator’s password   generated by  ( ). 
Let the set   represent all functions that could have resulted in generating this OTP. 
   * ( )                               ( )   + 
 Now we establish a mapping between these functions and the secrets that they represent. 
          by defining ( ( ))    ( ) 
The first step to show a one-to-one correspondence in this case is to show that the size of   and    are 
the same, more specifically they are both of size  .    is trivially of size  . For  , we first notice that 
there are   choices for the 0th coefficient which corresponds to  ( ). By fixing each possible 
coefficient along with the known  ( ),    is completely determined because  ( ) is a 1 degree 
polynomial with 2 known values  ( ) and  ( ) and can be determined with polynomial interpolation. 
Every function is unique because  ( ) differs for every function. By construction of   where we defined 
functions based on  ( ), we can see this mapping is onto as        is mapped by the function   
where  ( )   . Since    and   are of the same size   and the mapping is onto, the mapping is a one-
to-one correspondence. 
Update Procedure Proof Outline 
Proactive secret sharing is information-theoretically secure as long as seeing the publically exchanged 
information does not give any information about the private information used to update the password 
or the original secret. To show the security of the update mechanism, we use a similar approach as the 
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proof for the password scheme above. We need to show that by seeing the update material, the 
number of functions that could have generated that update material still produce every possible value 
for the unknown update information that is necessary in updating the password. We show this by 
establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the number of functions capable of generating the 
revealed update material and all possible values for the hidden material. This will show that seeing the 
public update material does not give an advantage into determining the hidden update material as all 
possible values for the hidden update material are still possible. 
Update Procedure Proof 
Establish the one-time password scheme by sharing a secret   between an authenticator and a 
generator. Now suppose the update phase generate the next password begins. The generator picks a 
function   ( )    
      
    and authenticator picks   ( )    
      
    both over   . As per the 
update procedure, the generator shares   ( ) with the authenticator while the authenticator 
shares   ( ) with the generator. Let an eavesdropper observe this update information in the form of 
the ordered pair (  ( )   ( )). An attacker needs to be able to determine   ( ) to calculate the next 
password as the used password because the new password is   ( )    ( )    
  and   ( ) and   
  
have already been observed. Let the set   represent the set of all functions that could have generated 
this pair. 
    *(     )     ( )     ( )   ( )     ( )   ( )    ( )   
 + 
Note that both these functions share the same value when evaluated at  , but an eavesdropper does 
not know this value as proven previously. Now we establish a mapping between these functions that 
could have generated the observed update material and all the values that   ( ) could have initially 
taken. 
          defined by ((     ))   (  ( )) 
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The first step in establishing the one-to-one correspondence is to show that the size of both sets is  . 
For   , this is trivially true. For  , since these functions are of degree 1, 2 points determine the function 
by interpolation. That is, if we pick any 2 points, there is only 1 function of degree 1 that passes through 
those points. So for the functions in   which are the same when evaluated at zero, there are   choices 
for that point and all   choices define unique functions since two unique points are defined for each 
function. Thus there are   functions pairs in   and the size of   is  . To show that this relation is a one-
to-one correspondence, we only need to show that the mapping in onto (surjective) as both sets are of 
order  . Pick a number     , let the function    be the function such that   ( )    and   ( )  
  ( ). Let the function    be the function such that   ( )    and   ( )    ( ). Both    and    are 
in   due to our construction of the pairs in  . Both sets are of size   and the mapping is onto, thus the 
mapping is a one-to-one correspondence. 
Initially, an attacker has   choices to guess what value is being added to the password. After seeing the 
update material, there are still   choices and thus an attacker has learned nothing about this value. A 
similar proof can show that an attacker is unable to determine which value is being added to the 
authenticator’s share. No information was learned about    because no information was leaked about 
the update material which could be used to interpolate   . The strategy outlined in the proof however 
shows how to enumerate all   choices of hidden update material. By fixing the point where both update 
functions have the same value (0) and taking one of the update values, the other value is determined 
because the polynomial is of degree 1. This could be done for both update function, as well as the secret 
splitting function   ( ). An attacker could construct a table as below, but this information cannot be 
used to determine anything, just enumerate possible values. 
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     ( )   ( )      
    ( )      
    ( )  
 ( )    
    ( ) 
      
          
      
    ( )      
    
    
              
  (    
   )            
      
    ( )        
    
      
Table 1: All possible hidden update material for each fixed secret. 
This attack cannot be strengthened by observing many passwords and update material as all update 
material is completely random each time. This table shows that by seeing all public information, an 
attacker still the same number of possible guesses at the next password as before the this information 
was revealed. 
There should be some note about the secret and the method in which it is updated. Although the shares 
are updated by adding random values, the secret is simply multiplied by 3 repeatedly. If 3 is not a 
primitive root of the group in which the secret belongs, then the secret will cycle through some 
subgroup of   . Even if the secret does cycle through every element of the group, the secret is still 
following a cycle and will have the same value at some future point of the scheme. Stronger yet, the 
secret will have the same progression of values in the future.  
This does not alter the security of the update mechanism. Although an attacker may be able to 
determine that secret at some point in time is equal to a previous secret, no information about that 
secret was leaked so that all secrets are still possible. An attacker is not able to use this knowledge in an 
attempt to determine the private update material, essential for determining the next password. This is 
because the shares and update material are chosen independently of the secret and can vary even if the 
secret is not. Even if a problem were found regarding this issue, an implementation could be written to 
 
 
26 
 
require re-initialization when a secret would cycle or check the cycle length of a given secret and 
determine if it is long enough for the lifetime of the authentication system. 
Verification Procedure Proof Outline 
This proof will be in the perspective of the generator creating verification material for the authenticator. 
The same method can be used to prove the other situation. To prove the security of the verification 
process, we need to show that by seeing     
      
    
 ( )  and   
 ( ) an attacker gains no knowledge of 
  
 ( )          
    or    
 ( )        
       
    . We have already shown that   
 ( ) gives no 
information on the secret and is chosen independently from   
 ( ) so   
 ( ) does not yield any 
information to an attacker.  Similarly to proving secret sharing,   
 ( ) does not reveal any information on 
the rest of   
 ( ). Thus the security of verifiable secret sharing rests with showing that     
   and     
  
does not yield any information to an attacker attempting to determine the secret or generate material 
that will result in share corruption. We will show this by showing that the function   does not give any 
information about its parameters. 
Update Procedure Proof 
We need to show that the operation  (   )        does not reveal information about  . The 
strategy to show this is to demonstrate that by fixing each possible x input to  , all possible output 
values in    are possible for some  . This will show that for each value outputted by  , every possible   
could have produced this value for some   which is unknown to the attacker. Define a mapping 
         as  ( )   
     for a fixed  . We wish to show that this mapping is a 1-to-1 
correspondence, a sort of permutation function of   . We will first show that both sets are of the same 
size. Then we will show that the mapping is onto. Trivially    is of size  . To determine the size of   , we 
first note that   
  is a multiplicative group of prime power and is thus cyclic. The fundamental theorem 
of cyclic groups states that for each divisor   of the order of a cyclic group, there exists a unique cyclic 
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subgroup of order  . Since   is a divisor of    , the order of   
 , we can define    be the unique such 
subgroup of order   that is proven to exist.  
To show the mapping is onto, we need to demonstrate that for every     , there exists      such 
that  ( )   . First we observe that   is a generator of    by construction. This means that we can 
produce any element of    by taking   to some power. Similarly,  
  which is fixed, is also some member 
of    that can be expressed as  
  for some     . So we can express  ( ) by  ( )   
         , 
which is simply some member of   . Since we can generate any value of    to be the sum of     by 
picking certain  , we can generate any element of    as   is a generator.  
We have shown that by picking certain  ,  ( ) can construct any member of   , thus  ( ) is onto. Since 
 ( ) is onto and the codomain and domain are of the same size,  ( ) is a 1-to-1 correspondence. A 
similar proof can be done to show that  (   ) does not reveal any information about  . Since none of 
the public information reveals insight into determining any of the private information, the verification 
process does not weaken the scheme, but does prevent a certain denial-of-service attack. 
Implementation 
Communication 
The biggest issue with implementing this OTP scheme is the communications required. The client 
wishing to be authenticated has to give some information to the authenticator between each use. This is 
not desirable as OTPs primary use case is as a personal identification number for bank machines and 
other such physical authentication scenarios where communication is limited. One way an 
implementation may deal with this issue is by generating a finite number of shares by following the 
protocol above, and having the client wishing to be authenticated and the authenticator store all OTPs 
and use the current OTP whenever authentication is desired. This is not unlike older methods of writing 
sequences of numbers or words on a sheet of paper and crossing of used passwords. The information 
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theoretic advantages of the scheme still remain intact as an eavesdropper is unable to predict the next 
OTP by seeing previous OTPs, unlike pseudo-random number generators or other OTP schemes. 
As with most cryptosystems, distribution of secret keys is difficult. The same problems face the 
proposed one-time password system. The secret material is the shared key, initial share, and any other 
information needed for the verification process. Secure methods of secret material distribution would 
be best achieved if accomplished by using physical contact to authenticate the user who will use the 
system. This kind of situation would be common in a corporate environment where the one-time 
password solution is utilized for physical access. If the distribution of the secret material were to happen 
remotely or with poor authentication techniques of the user, then the whole system could be 
compromised. Even if face-to-face or voice-based authentication mechanisms are used, attackers could 
use social engineering techniques and care must be taken. 
Storage Requirements 
Avoiding communication by storing many OTPs can cause storage requirement issues, especially on 
limited resource devices such as smart cards. The amount of storage required is dependent on the OTP 
size and the number of stored OTPs for future use. Since these numbers are finite and fixed at system 
setup, the amount of storage required is known in advance and simple to compute. In fact, the amount 
of storage as OTPs are used decreases; however this does not appear to be advantageous to limited 
resource devices. The amount of storage required is the size of the password multiplied by the number 
of passwords. 128 bits is often used as a strong key space to prevent brute force attacks [15]. For one 
authentication per day for a year,                 bits, or 45.5 kibibits, of storage are required. If 
3 128 bit OTPs were generated daily for 80 years, only 10.7 mebibytes of storage are required. 
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If communication is possible and the storage of keys is not required, only nominal space is required for 
the share,          and other similar information. Unfortunately a device in this class of capabilities in 
terms of communication is probably less resource constrained in terms of storage. 
Computational Requirements 
The OTP scheme consists of polynomial evaluation, polynomial interpolation, and basic arithmetic 
operations. The evaluation of polynomials using Horner’s method uses   multiplications and   additions 
for an  -degree polynomial [16]. Polynomial interpolation such as Lagrange interpolation is not 
computationally expensive, but since the proposed one-time password scheme only involves 
interpolating and evaluating lines, Lagrange interpolation is not required. To construct a more efficient 
interpolation method for lines, manipulate the point-slope formula      (
     
     
)  (    ). The 
values        and   are always known as      and   respectively. By plugging in the values for these 
variables, the formula to evaluate the line represented by two points at   becomes  ( )         , 
which consists of only three addition operations. This formula was used to construct Table 1 above. 
After initial setup, the use of the one-time password requires: 
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Process Operations Required Performed By 
Addition Multiplication Authenticator Generator 
Polynomial Interpolation 3 0 X  
Polynomial Evaluation 2 2 X X 
Polynomial Addition 4 0 X X 
Table 2 : Computational requirement breakdown 
The addition and multiplication operations to support the proposed scheme, however, must take place 
on numbers larger than most current machine’s native word sizes, often 128 bits or more each. If 
verifiable secret sharing is used to authenticate the update material, then more computation is 
required. The polynomials  ( ) for both the authenticator and generator need to be evaluated once, 
commitments to    and    computed, and the update material verified. These values differ for the 
authenticator and generator.  
Process 
Reason Operations Required 
Generator Authenticator Addition Multiplication Exponentiation 
Evaluation  ( )  ( ) 2 2 0 
Commitment 
    ( 
   )     ( 
   ) 0 2 4 
    (    
    )     (    
    ) 0 2 4 
Verification 
 (  
 ( )  ( ))  (  
 ( )  ( )) 0 2 4 
           
  2 4 1 
Total  4 12 13 
Table 3 : Requirements for computing update shares when verification is used. 
Table 3 shows that even with verification, the amount of computation is small and does not require 
sophisticated operations.  
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 Random Source and Distribution 
The proposed one-time password solution frequently requires random number for polynomial 
construction. During initialization, one random number is needed to construct the secret sharing 
polynomial. During update, two random numbers are needed to construct the update polynomials for 
the authenticator and generator. If the update material is verified, two more random numbers are 
required per round and two more random numbers at initialization time. So there needs to be at most 
    bits of random information at initialization and     bits per round for an   bit password system. 
As with all cryptographic systems, if the random number source is predictable in any way, then the 
security of the system is compromised. 
Comparison to other OTP solutions 
Disadvantages 
Communication 
During the update phase of the proposed OTP solution, the authenticator and the entity being 
authenticated need to exchange some update material. This can be implemented either interactively by 
having the authenticator and authenticated entity communicate over a bidirectional channel or by 
having the update material generated during the initialization phase and stored for later use. 
Sometimes it is infeasible to require a bidirectional communication. An example of this situation could 
be hardware tokens that do not have any input mechanism or networking capabilities. If the hardware 
token were a programmable smart card or a computer program, this is less of a problem as input 
mechanisms are available in these situations. 
If the update material was generated at initialization time, then the OTP solution is only valid for a 
predetermined number of uses. S/KEY also has a finite lifetime before a re-initialization period is 
required. The specification requires that some secure method of re-initializing the secret be establishes 
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[7]. If such a re-initialization method is provided, there still must be storage for the pre-computed OTPs 
because, unlike S/KEY, all OTPs are needed in advanced.  
The amount of material that must be exchanged between each use depends on the size of the secret 
material. Each round must exchange the password, the update material, and the verification material. 
The password, update material, and some of the verification material is all of the same size. However, 
some of the verification material, namely    and    can be bigger as they are restricted to being less 
than   in size instead of  . Since   and   are chosen, the amount of difference can be controlled. 
Assuming they are all less than   bits in size, the scheme takes no more than     bits of information in 
each direction,     bits of information in total each round. For normal symmetric security bit sizes 
such as    , this is     bytes per round. 
Advantages 
Security 
The proposed one-time password scheme is unique among one-time password schemes because of the 
information theoretic properties. Most schemes typically use a keyed-hash or encryption algorithms on 
a moving factor, typically a counter or timestamp. This technique does not provide security against an 
attacker with unlimited computational power who could use the unlimited computational resources to 
determine the moving factor by finding collisions with the hash algorithm or decrypting the password. In 
either case, the secret material used to generate the password can be discovered and future valid 
passwords can be generated. By using Shamir's secret sharing techniques, an eavesdropper gains no 
knowledge of the secret material that the OTPs are based upon. Even with unlimited computational 
power and previously utilized passwords, an attacker is unable to generate passwords that will be valid 
in the future. The only attack on a future password is brute force, trying all possible passwords. This kind 
of attack is very noisy and easily detectable by the authenticator. Systems such as SSH and other remote 
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logon systems prevent this by disallowing so many authentications in a set time period, and even 
preventing the offending IP address from ever logging in. 
The security is similar to one-time pads with a subtle difference, when attempting to decrypt a 
ciphertext that was encrypted with a one-time pad, each possible decryption is likely. The same is true 
for each future one-time password; however, the authenticator will tell an attacker if his guess is correct 
or not. Attackers of one-time pads would have to guess based on the decryption whether the correct 
key was used. 
The S/KEY and mOTP schemes use cryptographic hash functions (CHF) as their building blocks. CHFs are 
designed to prevent collisions, pre-image, and second pre-image attacks often by building upon hard 
problems. This means that the output of a CHF reveals some information about the message being 
hashed. Taking advantage of this leaked information is considered difficult now, but techniques to 
determine this obscured secret may exist in the future. One-time passwords that rely on CHFs for 
security in turn are revealing information that could be used to construct valid passwords for future use. 
HOTP and TOTP are OTP solutions that are built upon Hash-based Message Authentication Code 
(HMAC), a message authentication code built upon a CHF in such a way to mitigate extension attacks. 
Despite HMAC's proven resistance to many modern attacks upon the CHF in which it is based, HMACs do 
leak information about the underlying method used in the construction of the HMAC [17]. 
Computation 
The proposed OTP scheme is very computationally inexpensive and readily available to install on smart 
cards and other resource constrained devices. Although has functions are designed to be extremely 
efficient, they still often require many rounds of inexpensive operations. Public key systems that are 
used in authentication are extremely expensive computationally and require many bits of information. 
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As discussed earlier, the proposed scheme is computationally inexpensive and suitable for use in 
resource constrained devices. 
Future Work 
The proposed password system is a first in the area of utilizing secret sharing techniques as an 
authentication mechanism. There are variations to this scheme such as multiple participants using 
multiple shares to authenticate a group that require additional research. 
A hurdle to this password scheme adoption is implementation. The appendix outlines current 
implementations of the scheme, but there needs to more implementations that will be adopted by large 
corporations for the scheme to become a success. Future implementations may wish to consider 
methods to improving the ease of use of the system. For instance, a current transaction requires typing 
multiple unique hexadecimal numbers. This is not comfortable for most people. Translating the 
passwords and other numbers into words as S/Key does may be worth looking into. As with any 
authentication scheme, it should be well defined in a standard or presented in a manner to comply with 
existing standards to promote multiple implementations that successfully operating together. 
Conclusion 
A one-time password scheme based upon techniques developed for secret sharing techniques has been 
presented. The security of the system has been shown to be information-theoretically secure. This 
means that by seeing previous rounds of the password system, an adversary seeing all public 
information is unable to reduce the set of future possible passwords. This contrasts with previous 
password systems where a computationally unbounded adversary is able to determine future 
passwords. The computation and storage requirements of the passwords system have been shown to be 
low enough for resource constrained devices to implement such a system, which is typical for one-time 
password systems that are often implemented on a dedicated hardware token. Multiple 
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implementations of the system are described in the appendix and are demonstrations of the systems 
practicality. 
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Appendix  
C Library 
A library implementing the proposed one-time password solution has been developed in hopes of 
promoting its use. The library works on the basis of profiles. Each profile corresponds to a participant of 
the authentication system, so every user has a profile that represents a relationship between a certain 
authenticator and that user. If the user authenticates with more than one authenticator, they will have 
multiple profiles. The same holds true for the authenticator. The authenticator has a profile for each 
user that they authenticate. The library creates these profiles and loads them to compute the password, 
verify the password, update the shares, and verify the shares. Documentation of the library is provided 
digitally. 
The library comes with example programs designed to be run as command line applications for simple 
experimentation. A simple usage of these command line applications is as follows: 
 A user would be given a profile generated by the authenticator: 
o ./shamir-create-profile user-profile 
 The authenticator would generate his share also: 
o ./shamir-load-profile user-profile authenticator-profile 
 The user could generate a password: 
o ./shamir-generate-otp user-profile 
 The authenticator could check the password : 
o ./shamir-check-otp authenticator-profile otp 
The last two commands require communication of the update and verification material. This is done via 
standard input. 
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PAM Module 
To allow authentication via native applications already written, a PAM module was written that utilizes 
the C library described above. By providing a PAM module, applications such as login in environments 
that use PAM are capable of utilizing the proposed scheme to authenticate users. 
To use the PAM module, the pam module must be compiled and installed properly. Compilation 
generates a shared library that in most distributions should be placed in /lib/security. This 
process should be taken care of by the build system. Once properly installed, the application that wishes 
to use the one-time password scheme for authentication must edit a configuration file specific for that 
application that PAM uses. These configuration files are usually located in 
/etc/pam.d/application where application is the name of the application. The file should 
include a line that tells PAM to use the module. 
auth required shamir_otp 
For each user that wishes to be authenticated with the system, a configuration file must be placed in 
/etc/init.d/ 
Android Application 
Since most one-time password solutions require a hardware token, time to market is often very long. To 
reduce the difficulty of introducing this one-time password system to a user base, an Android 
application was written. Android is a mobile phone operating system that has become very popular 
recently. The application allows the hardware token to be replaced by the user’s cell phone or other 
Android device while still satisfying the something you have property of multi-factor authentication. The 
application is straight forward to use, but is unable to provide the convenience of loading profiles from 
files as the C library is. This just means that the user has to manually enter the contents of this file; this is 
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demonstrated in Figure 2. The actual presentation of the password from the generator to the user is 
demonstrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 2: The preparation of the generator for use in the password system. 
   
 
Figure 3: The generation of a password along with update and verification material. 
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Glossary 
Android - A mobile operating system based upon Linux and developed by Google Inc. 
Hash chain - A successive application of a cryptographic hash function. 
HMAC - Hash-based Message Authentication Code. An algorithm that computes a message 
authentication code by utilizing cryptographic hash functions and a secret key. 
Homomorphic encryption - A form of encryption where a specific algebraic operation performed on the 
plaintext is equivalent to another (possibly different) algebraic operation performed on the ciphertext. 
HOTP - HMAC-based One-Time Password. A one-time password algorithm specified by OATH that 
utilizes a message authentication code and a counter to construct passwords. 
Lagrange polynomial - The least degree polynomial that interpolates points using a technique named 
after Joseph Lagrange. 
Lamport’s scheme - See S/Key 
MAC - Message Authentication Code. An piece of information used to authenticate and verify the 
integrity of a message. MACs do not provide non-repudiation. 
MFA - Multifactor authentication. Authentication that happens on two or more independent factors of 
authentication. 
mOTP - Mobile One-Time Password. A one-time password algorithm designed to be implemented on 
mobile devices. 
OATH - Open Authentication. A group that publishes documents specifying authentication mechanisms. 
One-Time Password - A temporary password that is often used in a multi-factor authentication system. 
PAM - Portable Authentication Module. A software library that allows applications to hand off the 
process of authentication to a dedicated library. 
Polynomial interpolation - The process of constructing a polynomial which goes exactly through given 
points. 
Proactive secret sharing - Secret sharing that utilizes certain techniques to allow shares to be updated in 
such a way that prevents non-updated and updated shares from reconstructing the secret. 
S/Key - A one-time password system developed for dumb terminals that uses a hash chain to construct 
passwords. 
Secret sharing - The act of creating multiple shares from an initial secret in such a way that the shares 
can be combined to generate the secret. 
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Share - A portion of the secret that under some circumstances with other shares reconstruct that secret. 
Threshold - The number of shares in a secret sharing scheme that are required to reconstruct the secret. 
TOTP - Time-based One-Time Password. A one-time password algorithm specified by OATH that utilizes 
a message authentication code and the current time to construct time-based passwords. 
Verifiable secret sharing - Secret sharing that utilizes certain techniques to allow share receivers to 
verify that the shares they are receiving are not corrupt or maliciously crafted. 
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